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CONCEPTUAL OVERBURDEN IN THE 
SYSTEM'S OPERATION?: OF JUDGES 
AND SCHOLARS, JURISDICTION AND 
ALL THAT 
James Dickson Phillips, Jr. * 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, VOLUMES 13-19: JURISDIC-
TION AND RELATED MATTERS. By Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller, and Edward H. Cooper. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co. 1975-1982. $26 per volume. 
With the publication in 1982 of Volumes 19 and 20, Professors Wright, 
Miller and Cooper closed the ring on this superb multi-volume treatise on 
federal practice and procedure.1 The publication of Volume 19 also com-
pleted the particular unit with which this review is concerned, that on Juris-
diction and Related Matters. 
Given the dual significance of the unit's completion, it may be appropri-
ate to indulge a preliminary thought about the coincidental completion of 
the entire work. Begun in 1969 with Charles Alan Wright's publication 
under his own name of the first three volumes of the successor work to the 
Barron & Holtzojf treatise,2 which, starting in 1951, he had expanded and 
supplemented in "Wright Editions," the completed treatise runs now, thir-
teen years later and with the collaboration of several distinguished coau-
thors, to 25 bound volumes, including indexes, appendices, and tables. 
These volumes, in tum, are subdivided into four discrete, titled units that 
reflect the classic categories of adjective law: criminal procedure, civil pro-
cedure, jurisdiction and related matters, and evidence - essentially the 
gamut of practice and procedure as the term has been most widely 
perceived. 
The completed treatise is a magnificent achievement of scholarship and 
plain hard work. Its completion entitles its principal author3 to the respect, 
admiration and gratitude of all who labor in the legal vineyard and, though 
they know it not, of all who have a stake in the effective administration of 
justice. As one who has directly benefited from this and the predecessor 
Wright-edited work as practitioner, teacher, and judge, I take this opportu-
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. - Ed. 
I. "Ring-closing" is used because these are not the last volumes in numerical order. The 
ring, of course, will continue to be opened from time to time by the addition of new bound 
volumes to accommodate expanded materials, as just recently with a new volume IOA. 
2. W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS 
(1960). 
3. This is not to denigrate the contributions of the distinguished coauthors, Professors 
Miller, Cooper, Gressman, Graham, and Kane. Wright's ability to enlist the collaboration of 
such colleagues is but another measure of his achievement. 
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nity to express these sentiments for myself and, I feel sure, for countless 
others. While his financial rewards from the endeavor are - I hope and 
trust - adequate when measured by the world's standards, I have a notion, 
knowing something of his fierce pride of scholarship, that the achievement 
is itself no inconsiderable reward by more inward standards. May he long 
enjoy both. 
The seven main volumes making up the Jurisdiction and Related Mat-
ters unit did not emerge full-blown as a unit but came volume by volume 
over a seven-year period, from 1975 to 1982. The first five, 13-17, published 
between 1975 and 1978, deal with fundamentals of the organization and 
judicial power of the federal courts, the basic grounds of district court juris-
diction - federal question, diversity, etc. - venue and removal in the dis-
trict courts, jurisdiction of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, 
appellate procedure in both courts,4 problems of appealability under the 
appellate jurisdictional grants, and other matters intimately related to the 
exercise of those grants. The sixth volume, 18, published in 1981, deals 
with res judicata;5 and the last, 19, published in 1982, with the Erie 
doctrine. 
This is of course a vast body of material, and major portions of it have 
been in the public domain and in heavy use by bench, bar and legal 
academe for a considerable period of time. Under the circumstances, an 
exegetic review of the whole is neither possible nor wanted, nor would it be 
bearable if attempted. As a general assessment, it suffices simply to observe 
that the high quality of the materials in this unit - as in the entire treatise 
- is immediately and persistently manifest, in terms of accuracy, organiza-
tion, coverage, lucidity, depth of insight, and general style, to any user who 
puts it to regular test. It seems unnecessary to temper this general judgment 
with the customary examples which undoubtedly exist but which this re-
viewer has neither chanced upon nor bothered to ferret out - of significant 
flat inaccuracies, arguable errors of analysis, failures of coverage, and orga-
nizational oddities that inevitably occur in any endeavor of this magnitude. 
I tum instead to a few general ruminations stirred by contemplation of the 
unit as a whole. 
The first has simply to do with the unit's coverage and is prompted by 
its title - Jurisdiction and Related Matters - specifically by the last part. 
The 'Jurisdiction" referred to is, of course, subject matter jurisdiction. The 
other dimension of judicial power - including personal, in rem, and quasi 
in rem (or, now generically, "territorial")6 jurisdiction -is systematically 
treated elsewhere7 in the treatise. 
The "relatedness" in the title is therefore to subject matter jurisdiction. 
4. The treatment of Supreme Court procedure is only interstitial to discussion of its juris-
diction. Court of appeals procedure is addressed directly in Volume 16, in connection with the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
5. The Res Judicata volume has previously been reviewed in the Michigan Law Review. 
Casad, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REV. 664 (1982). 
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 1(2) (1982). 
1. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 1064-1075 (1969) (discussed in conjunction with rule 4 governing service of process) [here-
inafter cited as WRIGHT]. 
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Despite the potentially unlimited reach of the term "related" when applied 
to any part of the law's seamless web, there may not be a more serviceable 
or informative one to embrace the topics here embraced. They comprise a 
body of concepts that have always lain uneasily, along with jurisdiction 
itself, within the general law of "practice and procedure." Of chief impor-
tance among these "related matters" may be noted: the concept of ''.jus-
ticiability" as primarily derived from constitutional case or controversy 
constraints on exercises of judicial power; subsumed concepts of standing, 
mootness, ripeness, feigned issues, etc.; other purely prudential limitations 
on exercises of jurisdiction - abstention principles and rules and principles 
restricting the scope of appellate review; timing limitations on exercises of 
appellate jurisdiction - the vexed problems of appealability and writ re-
view; the choice of law problems forced by federalism, including federal 
common law and Erie; and, probably least "related," res judicala. 
The "related matters" of the unit's title are essentially, therefore, all 
those concepts, doctrines, principles and rules whose emergence has been 
forced by the inevitable problems of operating the federal system within the 
constraints of the fundamental jurisdictional grants and of constitutional 
federalism. In rough sum, therefore, the "Jurisdiction and Related Mat-
ters" unit can be said to deal comprehensively with the structure Gurisdic-
tion) and the dynamics of operation ("related matters") of the federal 
judicial system. This is, of course, a conceptually heavy body of law that, as 
I will show, is getting heavier. 
Indeed, it is difficult to think of another substantial body off ederal law 
on the "procedural" side of things - unless it be the whole of criminal 
procedure - that in recent years has undergone such an expansion and 
refinement of doctrine as has this one. Primarily, of course, this develop-
ment has been in the realm of the system's dynamics-in matters "related" 
to jurisdiction. The basic structure of courts and jurisdiction has undergone 
little change despite all the talk of abolishing or reducing diversity jurisdic-
tion, cutting back on selected elements of federal question jurisdiction, and 
constituting a new intermediate court of appeals. But in the "related mat-
ters" with which this unit deals, there is not only a flood of new cases but 
signs of a developing conceptual overburden whose causes and effects are 
an interesting subject for speculation and, possibly, concern. 
The burgeoning space accorded these matters in the treatise reflects -
though not in any exact measure - the underlying phenomenon. Of the 
numerous examples, two suffice as illustration. 
Take first "standing." In Volume 13, published in 1975, a total of 61 
pages of text and footnotes were devoted to this one facet of the more gen-
eral concept of justiciability. When, in 1980, it had already become neces-
sary to publish a bound cumulative supplement to this volume, a total of 54 
pages of new annotated text along with another 60 pages of supplementary 
case annotations were added to deal with the standing decisions of the in-
tervening five years. And, in the 1982 pocket supplement, there appeared 
yet another 37 pages, ten of which were devoted to new annotated text. 
The explosion of abstention doctrine is similarly reflected in the trea-
tise's allocation of page coverage. To this body of doctrine - which only 
first emerged in 1941 in quite limited form-the final Wright edition of the 
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predecessor work, as supplemented through 1975, devoted only around 30 
pages of annotated text. When Volume 17 of the treatise under review was 
published in 1978, it gave to this topic a complete subchapter of 8 sections 
· and around 103 pages of annotated text. And this has now been expanded 
in the 1982 pocket part by 42 pages of text and new and supplementary case 
annotations. 
Generally comparable examples of doctrinal expansion in both case-
volume and conceptual terms exist in other "related matters": e.g., Erie 
doctrine;8 government appeals in criminal cases;9 federal-state res judicata 
problems;10 political question doctrine; 11 mootness. 12 The case-volume ex-
pansion in these areas is undoubtedly explainable in major part simply as a 
consequence of the general explosion of litigation in recent years. The con-
ceptual complication that has accompanied the volume surge is the more 
interesting, and bothersome, phenomenon. Here, again, it suffices to illus-
trate with three examples. 
Take standing, again. Here the conceptual problem - analytically and 
definitionally- remains essentially at the level of its beginnings. We still 
grapple to capture and state the principle's essence at a serviceable level of 
generality. A flood of particularized decisions has not yet yielded the ex-
pected fruit of the common law decisional process - a workable general 
theory. Witness the Supreme Court's latter-day effort in .Davis v. Pass-
man, 13 simply to lay better hold upon the core concept by differentiating it 
from the related concepts of jurisdiction, cause of action and remedy that 
have been around as fundamental elements of procedure from its earliest 
days. Perhaps an analytical and definitional problem this resistant to gen-
eral resolution over so long a period may be logically intractable. But the 
case flood endures - with or without clear conceptual guidance for resolu-
tion of standing problems. 
As a second example, take government appeals in criminal cases. While 
the ultimate source of new doctrinal complexity here is a _relatively rare 
congressional alteration of a fundamental jurisdictional grant, the concep-
tual miseries arise from importing the dispositive matter of double jeopardy 
into the new statutory grant. The Criminal Appeals Act of 197014 was in-
terpreted early by the Supreme Court as being intended to remove all non-
constitutional barriers to government appeals, leaving only those found in 
double jeopardy.15 Though the perceived congressional purpose was to re-
move the uncertainties inherent in the extant statutory grant dating from 
1907, these uncertainties have proved to be nothing as compared to the im-
ported conceptual problems of double jeopardy. Indeed, in the course of 
defining the new contours of permissible government appeals under double 
jeopardy constraints, the Supreme Court has encountered some of the most 
8. 19 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at§§ 4501-4515. 
9. 15 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at§ 3919. 
10. 18 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at §§ 4466-4473. 
11. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 3534. 
12. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at § 3533. 
13. 442 U.S. 228, 236-44 & n.18 (1979). 
14. 18 u.s.c. § 3731 (1976). 
15. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975). 
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difficult and inconclusive aspects of double jeopardy analysis in its 
history.16 
Finally, take that old conceptual dragon, the Erie doctrine. Considering, 
in retrospect, the tortured conceptual maze through which so fundamental a 
matter as choosing the proper rule of decision for federal courts has been 
wrung evokes equal measures of wonder and grief. One by one the hoped-
for general solutions - procedure or substance, outcome-determinative, 
overriding federal interest in procedural uniformity - have been revealed 
as merely inconclusive lurches along the path. Each of the periodic special 
insights into controlling principles- anti-forum shopping, inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws, "primary obligations" - has lacked sufficient 
breadth or conceptual precision to provide a general solution. And while 
one might have hoped that over a period of forty-odd years the potential 
range of cases raising close Erie questions would have been substantially 
exhausted and decided, albeit on particularized bases without benefit of a 
controlling general theory, that simply has not happened. New variations 
continue to arise - the supply seems inexhaustible17 - and the conceptual 
tangle remains, despite the flood of intervening particularized decisions 
and the massive judicial and scholarly efforts to synthesize them. 
The general picture suggested by these limited examples is one of vast 
expenditures of effort and time in wrestling with fundamental questions re-
specting basic operations of the federal judicial system - questions which, 
though heavily policy laden, are still essentially "procedural." After all, 
they concern, in the final analysis, only "threshold" matters: May this gov-
ernment appeal be considered on the merits? May this action be prosecuted 
at all by this party? Which sovereign's rule is to be applied to decide this 
case? Each of these examples is characterized by great conceptual difficulty 
which seems to be increasing in complexity rather than yielding to general 
solution by the normal synthesizing process. Consequently, substantial re-
sources are being spent in coping with conceptual difficulties whose resolu-
tion in the particular case frequently leads only to the result that the merits 
are or are not addressed at the time and in the forum chosen by the instigat-
ing party. The system's basic "procedure" seems to be afflicted with an 
increasing conceptual overburden in many of its most vital elements. 
From a perception that the phenomenon exists in significant degree, ru-
mination turns inevitably to causes. And the first wonderment is whether in 
16. See the Supreme Court decisions starting with United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 
(1975), and running, in order of decision, though by no means in a straight line, through 
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 337 (1975); 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 
23 (1977); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 
(1978). 
The suggestion in text that these decisions involve inconclusive analysis is, of course, made 
with all respect. If the appraisal is valid, it simply reflects the conceptual difficulties that are 
the theme of this review. The line of decisions is indeed replete with recognitions by members 
of the Court of the tortured path of analysis. See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. at 
80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
17. As illustrations, this reviewer can cite with some wryness two recent examples in which 
he was unable to induce full panel concurrence in two Erie problem cases presenting new 
variations on the ancient theme. See Yarber v. Allstate Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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this field - as Professor Grant Gilmore has convincingly suggested did 
happen in the law of contract18 - the scholars may not be large contribu-
tors to the growing conceptual burden. 
Certainly the intellectual power, the influence, and the sheer numbers of 
contemporary proceduralist scholars is adequate for the purpose. Indeed, 
one of the most interesting thoughts prompted by the completion of this 
second major multi-volume treatise on federal procedure is of the ex-
traordinary number of truly first-rate legal scholars who have labored in 
recent years in the various fields of adjective law including, in particular, 
the federal courts and the federal system.19 
But, for this reviewer at least, that possibility is quickly dispelled. 
Though the efforts of the great proceduralist scholars in matters of federal 
jurisdiction and related matters have been solid and influential, their pri-
mary thrust has been toward synthesis and critical commentary rather than 
the independent development of general theory. Of course, whenever fun-
damental re-thinkings of the basic structure and its procedure have been 
undertaken - as in the process leading to adoption of the federal rules of 
procedure and the more recent ALI jurisdictional study - the proceduralist 
scholars have participated by invitation, and with great influence. But aside 
from these occasional opportunities to redesign, their efforts have focused 
mainly on the matters of which I speak - expository, critical, and synthe-
sizing endeavors directed at judicially developed doctrine. To the extent 
that standing, Erie and double jeopardy as a measure of appealability are 
examples of a general conceptual overburden in the federal system, the 
fault cannot be laid at these scholars' doors. 
Indeed, it may be improper to suggest that fault can be laid at the door 
of anyone - unless it be Congress and the framers of the Constitution. 
And even as to these it is probably more accurate and fair to speak in terms 
of simple cause rather than fault. For the basis of the conceptual overbur-
den is probably best attributed simply to fate and the adversarial system. 
Given the built-in tendency of the adversarial system, featuring party-shap-
ing of issues, to run out every legal concept to and beyond its logical end, 
the move toward increasing conceptual complexity in these matters was 
predictable and essentially inexorable. 
This can readily be seen by looking again, briefly, at one of the three 
examples of conceptual complexity chosen to illustrate the phenomenon. 
The increasing conceptual difficulty and logical intractability of the 
"standing" problem simply reflect the underlying difficulty of continually 
adapting to increasingly more sophisticated procedural forms and substan-
tive doctrine the premises of an adversarial litigation system that in its ori-
gins was a quite primitive one designed to resolve only an artificially 
18. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 17-18 (1974). 
19. To attempt an exhaustive listing of all those who should be included in the front ranks 
of the proceduralist scholars suggested in text would be far too risky. For starters and simply 
to illustrate, the following names gleaned solely from the spines of books currently on the 
shelves of a federal judge's chambers library would surely be included in any fair listing: Ba-
tor, Carrington, Clark, Cleary, Cooper, Cound, Currie, Dobbs, Ehrenzweig, Field, Piss, 
Friedenthal, Graham, Gressman, Hazard, Israel, James, Kamisar, Kaplan, LaFave, Louisell, 
McCoid, Miller, Mishkin, Moore, Rosenberg, Shapiro, Vestal, Ward, Wechsler, Weinstein, 
and Wright. 
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constricted range of issues arising from an equally primitive body of private 
substantive law. The typical litigation pattern in which standing problems 
now arise is likely to involve multiple parties (public and private, class and 
individual, natural, and other) asserting substantive claims and defenses 
based in constitutional or statutory sources of public law. This pattern 
bears little resemblance to the paradigmatic litigation pattern of the sys-
tem's origins in which two natural person parties litigated only a single is-
sue of private common law, seeking narrowly circumscribed and 
standardized relief. It is no wonder that the originally primitive, related 
concepts of cause of action and remedy, along with party standing, have 
simply been wrenched from their conceptual moorings. What is going on 
here is of course something more profound than a "merely" procedural ad-
aptation, but it has to be accomplished within the traditional procedural 
forms. 
That there would be great conceptual difficulties and the necessity for a 
long period of working through this and other jurisdictionally related con-
ceptual problems with a multitude of particularized decisions was pre-
ordained. Recrimination is not in order for either the courts or the scholars. 
We must simply stay at it for awhile. 
In helping to work through these conceptual problems, the procedural 
scholars of our time must be given high marks. As indicated, their influ-
ence has been mainly felt with respect to synthesis and constructive criti-
cism of the products of the belabored judicial process. Among the many 
examples are such single volume treatises as the highly influential Hart & 
W echsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, now in its second 
edition,20 and Charles Alan Wright's own amazingly compact and valuable 
Law of Federal Courts .21 In addition, many influential pieces appear in the 
law reviews, including, as a particularly interesting example, the series of 
articles constituting an unfolding colloquy on Erie among Professors Ely, 
Chayes and Mishkin in the aftermath of Hanna v. Plumer.22 
There is simply no way to reckon the influence on the courts and judi-
cial doctrine of these and comparable scholarly endeavors. Certainly, this 
influence is even more pervasive than the actual citations in opinions would 
indicate. My estimate is that it is so pervasive that many judges might be 
made somewhat uncomfortable if its full extent were revealed. But I think 
the bench should not be troubled by the scope of scholarly influence. The 
interplay of judicial and scholarly efforts at clarifying and applying legal 
doctrine is an ancient and honorable one in our tradition, and should be 
freely recognized. 
Which brings me, finally, full circle to the treatise unit under review. 
Surely one of the most difficult problems for authors of such a treatise is 
fixing upon the basic editorial purpose of the work and then maintaining it 
with reasonable consistency. Particularly for authors of a procedure trea-
20. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973). 
21. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983), 
22. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974); Chayes, The Bead 
Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1974); Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV, L. Rev. 753 (1974); 
Mishkin, The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682 (1974). 
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tise, the problem of "for just whom are we writing" is acute. Every lawyer 
- at least every litigator - is a potential user. The subject matter is not 
sufficiently esoteric in all its elements that a generally sophisticated level is 
automatically dictated, as it may be in such areas as antitrust, patent or 
admiralty. The workaday lawyer may well need it for edification in the 
most mundane matters. 
But for such a treatise there is also a wider potential range of readers 
whose quite different needs must also be taken into account: judges, law 
teachers, other scholars, and lawyers with difficult conceptual problems out 
of the ordinary course. The problem of balance and basic editorial purpose 
is exceedingly difficult, particularly with respect to subject matter that 
abounds in the kind of extremely difficult conceptual problems dealt with in 
the unit under review. 
At several points in volume prefaces, the authors state editorial purposes 
that recognize the difficulties of striking a proper balance. An early one is 
"to provide extremely complete coverage of the cases" and to "emphasize 
the practical needs of the lawyer."23 But in a preface to one of the later 
volumes, a more sophisticated assessment of the difficulties appears.24 It 
may well reflect an accumulation of experience in attempting properly to 
treat open conceptual problems of the type that dominate the Jurisdiction 
and Related Matters unit while at the same time keeping in mind the "law-
yer with a modest library and [a] problem that deserves more than just a 
glance at the rules." 
My final judgment on the unit under review is that the author:; have 
done an unusually fine job of maintaining a properly balanced approach. 
There are exceedingly good, straightforward expositions of what to the ex-
perienced federal practitioner may be "obvious" aspects of such mundane 
topics as amount in controversy, but to the young lawyer with his first such 
problem may appear to be a startling revelation of something never touched 
in law school. 
But there is also a great deal of superb, sophisticated analysis of the 
more difficult conceptual problems that do abound in this unit. At their 
best, these are excellent free-standing essays synthesizing both the main-
lines of judicial decision and the best of the scholarly commentaries upon 
the subject. Of the numerous examples, I would mention in particular the 
general discussion of standing doctrine in section 3531, the beautifully-
crafted summary of the whole course of Erie doctrinal development in sec-
tions 4501-05, the exhaustive synthesis of the double jeopardy/government 
appeals decisions in section 3919 and the fine, tightly drawn analysis of 
political question abstention in section 3534. 
Such carefully and lucidly written mini-essays are a particularly valua-
ble resource for anyone, judge, lawyer, or teacher, who needs an accurate 
but manageable general overview in order to come to grips with a specific 
problem. It is the knowledge that these exist that causes me frequently to 
send a puzzled law clerk to this unit with the confident suggestion that it is 
likely to provide just such aid. 
23. 4 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at x. 
24. 21 WRIGHT, supra note 6, at vi. 
